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Summary 
The Work Programme is delivered by 18 private, public and voluntary sector 
organisations, working under contract to DWP. These organisations are known as 
prime providers, or "primes", and operate within a geographical Contract Package 
Area (CPA). Each CPA has either two or three primes and individuals entering the 
Work Programme are randomly assigned to one of these.  Comparing the outcomes 
of individuals assigned to each prime within a CPA provides robust estimates of 
relative effectiveness. Overall, there are 40 contracts across Britain, allowing 26 
within-CPA comparisons. 
An interim report confirmed both that randomisation had worked well and that there 
was statistically significant variation in outcomes between primes.  This report 
extends the interim analysis to relate the variation in outcomes to differences in the 
services offered by primes.  By doing so, it aims to understand what makes some 
primes more effective than others.   
The results provide evidence of certain aspects of service being more associated 
with better outcomes than others and that much of this is concentrated among 
particular subgroups. Several relationships have been revealed which could provide 
some clues as to what is driving the variation in provider performance.  However, the 
analytical approach provides evidence of an association only and does not enable us 
to establish whether these relationships are causal in nature.  In addition, much of 
the variation in performance is not associated in a statistically significant way with the 
provider characteristics that we have been able to measure.  This may suggest that 
the key characteristics have not been taken into account.   
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Glossary of Terms  
Black box A term for minimum service prescription, which 
allows providers to decide which interventions to 
offer to programme participants in order to achieve 
sustainable employment. 
End-to-end provider A provider that covers the range of general 
employment-related services a participant receives 
throughout their time on a programme. 
Herfindahl index A measure of market concentration 
Jobcentre Plus Jobcentre Plus is part of the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP). It provides services that 
support people of working age from welfare into 
work, and helps employers to fill their vacancies. 
Job outcome payment A payment to the prime triggered by a Work 
Programme participant entering work and 
remaining employed for a specified period 
National Benefits Database A database recording individuals’ benefit payments 
Participant  A person on the Work Programme.  Referred to as 
a claimant prior to participation on the Work 
Programme.  
Payment Group Work Programme participants are divided into nine 
payment groups based on the benefit they claim 
and prior circumstances (e.g. prison leavers, young 
people formerly NEET). Providers are paid at 
different rates for outcomes achieved by different 
payment groups. 
Provider Referrals and Payments An IT system which automates the clerical referrals 
and payments process for providers. This was 
introduced to replace paper-based systems, as well 
as to facilitate the smoother exchange of 
information about participants referred for 
provision. 
Referrals data Information supplied to DWP by primes on details 
of their referrals to subcontractors. 
Self-delivery The provision of services to Work Programme 
participants by the prime rather than a 
subcontractor. 
Specialist provider A specialist provider typically provides niche 
services such as provision of support for those 
wanting to become self-employed or support 
related to a participant’s health or underlying 
issues, such as drug rehabilitation or debt 
management. 
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Subcontractor (or “sub”) An organisation delivering services as part of a 
primes supply chain. 
Supply chain The organisations providing services to Work 
Programme participants under contract to a prime. 
Sustained job outcome  Employment that lasts for at least 13 or 26 weeks 
(depending on the customer group).  
Sustainment payment A payment to primes for each successive month of 
sustained employment following a job outcome 
payment 
The Department The Department for Work and Pensions 
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Abbreviations 
 
CPA Contract Package Area  
DWP Department for Work and Pensions 
ESA Employment and Support Allowance 
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
JSA  Jobseeker’s Allowance 
MSS Market Share Shift 
NBD National Benefits Database 
PbR Payment by Results 
PRaP Provider Referrals and Payment 
VCSE Voluntary and Community sector and Social Enterprise
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1 Executive summary 
1.1 Introduction 
The Work Programme is the UK’s major welfare-to-work programme.  It was launched 
throughout Great Britain in June 2011, replacing much of employment support previously 
on offer.  It provides personalised support to welfare recipients who have been receiving 
benefits long-term or who are at risk of doing so.  
The Work Programme is delivered by 18 private, public and voluntary sector organisations, 
working under contract to DWP. These organisations are known as prime providers, or 
"primes", and operate within a geographical Contract Package Area (CPA). Each CPA has 
either two or three primes and individuals entering the Work Programme are randomly 
assigned to one of these.  Comparing the outcomes of individuals assigned to each prime 
within a CPA provides robust estimates of relative effectiveness. Overall, there are 40 
contracts across Britain, allowing 26 within-CPA comparisons. 
An interim report confirmed both that randomisation had worked well and that there was 
statistically significant variation in outcomes between primes.  This report extends the 
interim analysis to relate the variation in outcomes to differences in the services offered by 
primes.  By doing so, it aims to understand what makes some primes more effective than 
others.   
   
1.2 Empirical approach 
The analysis used a two-stage regression approach to relate provider impacts to a range of 
service indicators.  An important limitation of the analysis is that it cannot provide causal 
estimates.  That is, the results should not be taken to mean that the differences in 
measured service type are responsible for the differences in primes' relative effectiveness.  
An estimation dataset was constructed from four sources: 
1. Administrative data on all 1.65 million individuals referred to the Work Programme 
between June 2011 and September 2014, with benefit and employment outcomes 
tracked until December 2014.  This allowed the following outcomes to be observed: 
 Whether off benefit 12/18/24 months after referral 
 Whether employed 12/18/24 months after referral 
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 Whether there has been a Job Outcome payment within 12/18/24 months of 
referral  
 Whether there has been a Sustainment Payment within 12/18/24 months of 
referral.  
2. Information provided by DWP on the discounts offered by primes at the time of 
bidding.  This allowed the following measure to be calculated: 
 Total potential revenue from each referral. 
3. Information requested of primes by DWP regarding the number of onward referrals 
to their subcontractors.  This allowed the following features of the supply chain to be 
measured: 
 % referrals self-delivered, by year 
 % referrals passed to private sector subcontractors, by year 
 % referrals passed to public sector subcontractors, by year 
 % referrals passed to voluntary sector subcontractors, by year 
 % referrals passed to specialist subcontractors, by year 
 % referrals passed to end to end subcontractors, by year 
 Herfindahl index of supply chain, by year 
4. Drawing on information from prime provider websites and their records at 
Companies House, we identify a dummy variable for primes where the 'Provider is 
not 100% private sector'. 
 
5. A survey of Work Programme participants, which asks respondents about their 
experience of the Work Programme. This was used to characterise service with 
regard to respondents’ recall of: 
 Mode of contact  
o % via group meeting 
o % via telephone 
o % via text 
 Frequency of contact 
 Nature of support: 
o % receiving assessment of skills 
o % drawing up an action plan 
o % receiving training in maths, reading, writing 
o % participating in work experience placement or voluntary work 
o % receiving advice for setting up own business 
o % receiving financial advice. 
o % warned of risk of benefit cut. 
Regression models were able to capture the relationship between impacts and service type 
overall and also for subgroups defined across age, sex and payment group.  
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1.3 Results 
Testing confirmed that the nature of service as captured through these measures differed 
significantly across primes.  This is a pre-requisite for examining how primes' effectiveness 
varied with service type. 
The main results are summarised below. 
 Frequency of contact appears associated with positive outcomes, particularly for 
employment and Sustainment Payments.  More frequent contact may be especially 
important for females and for Customer Group 1 (JSA 18-24).   
 Mode of contact may matter for outcomes. Contacting claimants by telephone is 
associated with better employment outcomes overall. Effects on employment 
outcomes, Job Outcomes and Sustainment Payments appear to be stronger for 
younger claimants.  The possible effect of other forms of contact varies by claimant 
type.  For example, group meetings may be particularly suited to the ‘Other ESA-IB’ 
group, while text messages may be less effective for them. 
 The nature of the support varies in its association with impacts.  Offering work 
placements is uncorrelated with outcomes while providing help starting a business is 
strongly associated with a reduction in benefit.  Different types of support appear 
better-suited to particular subgroups.  Business start-up support is suited to prime-
age JSA claimants.  Drawing up an action plan, while not significant overall, appears 
more effective for older individuals and for non-JSA claimants. Skills assessments 
appear particularly badly-suited to older people but may work better for non-JSA 
claimants.  English and maths training may be somewhat less effective for older 
claimants and more effective for the Other ESA-IB Customer Group. Financial advice 
is associated with higher employment among the JSA 18-24 group.  Lastly, our 
results are suggestive of a negative association between the share of claimants 
stating they were informed of the risk of losing all or part of their benefit if they fail to 
comply with Work Programme requirements (i.e. benefit sanctions) and job outcome 
payments and sustainment payments, but we find no association with employment or 
benefit receipt outcomes.   
 With regards to the supply chain, sectoral composition appears unimportant, as 
does self-delivery and the degree of competition.  However, there are some 
subgroup differences.  Prime age, particularly JSA, claimants may do better than 
other groups when assigned to providers that are not 100% for-profit.  For claimants 
aged 35-44, self-delivery is associated with better outcomes.  On the other hand, 
claimants age 45 and over appear to benefit from referrals to a private sector 
subcontractors. Individuals in the "Other ESA-IB" group appear to do less well when 
referred to a public sector subcontractor.  The use of specialist as opposed to end-to-
end providers is not associated with effectiveness, although again there is subgroup 
variation.  Older claimants appear to do somewhat better than younger claimants 
under primes that refer more to end-to-end provision. Bigger differences are seen 
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with specialist provision; this is more effective both for older claimants and the New 
ESA Customer Group. 
 The total potential revenue from each individual - as determined by discounts - is 
not associated with outcomes overall. The absence of associations also largely plays 
out among the subgroups considered.  
1.4 Conclusion 
The results provide evidence of certain aspects of service being more associated with 
better outcomes than others and that much of this is concentrated among particular 
subgroups. This is perhaps to be expected given the varied nature of Work Programme 
participants who are likely to differ in the way they respond to differences in provider 
support.  The observed associations may provide some clues as to what might be driving 
provider effectiveness.  However, characteristics used in the analysis may well correlate 
with other, unobservable or omitted, characteristics, which makes it impossible to 
disentangle which one may be the true driver of differences in outcomes. As a result, the 
analysis cannot prove cause and effect – it simply provides some clues as to what might be 
driving provider effectiveness. 
Furthermore, looking across all participants, the conclusion is that much of the variation in 
provider performance remains unexplained. For example, only one of the observed 
characteristics is associated with differences in more than three of the twelve performance 
measures analysed.  This is further evidence to suggest that the unobserved characteristics 
may be the key drivers for performance.  
Finally, it is important to view these results in the context of the wider evidence base on 
what drives performance in employment support. In some cases, other studies specifically 
designed to test the effectiveness of a given form of support are likely to provide more 
conclusive evidence on that works.   
There is scope for follow-on analysis to probe further the results reported here.  As a 
general comment, randomisation within CPA has provided a low-cost way of being able to 
assess relative provider effectiveness.  This continues the approach used with the Flexible 
New Deal and one might expect it to be continued with the successor to the Work 
Programme.  Over time, as the number of estimates grows, there will be more opportunity 
to model the data in a way that can allow more definite statements about the causal 
relationships in the data.  
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2 Introduction 
The Work Programme is the UK’s major welfare-to-work programme.  It was launched 
throughout Great Britain in June 2011, replacing much of the employment support 
previously on offer, including the New Deals, Employment Zones and Pathways to Work.  It 
provides personalised support to welfare recipients who have been receiving benefits long-
term or who are at risk of doing so.  
The Work Programme is delivered by 18 private, public and voluntary sector organisations, 
working under contract to DWP. These organisations are known as prime providers, or 
"primes".  
The aim of this research is to understand what makes some primes more effective than 
others.  Essentially, the idea is to try and open up the “black box” and to explore what might 
drive any observed differences in outcomes.  Examples of the characteristics of primes that 
might influence outcomes include: 
 the type of support provided by the prime 
 whether for profit or not for profit 
 characteristics of the supply chain 
 the degree of competition among subcontractors 
 the tendency to ‘self-deliver’ rather than subcontract. 
Furthermore, we can also explore variations across, for example:  
 payment groups 
 men and women 
 age bands. 
Importantly, individuals entering the Work Programme are randomly assigned to one of the 
two or three providers operating within their Contract Package Area (CPA).  This allows 
robust (experimental) estimates of the effectiveness of each prime relative to the other 1 or 
2 primes operating locally.  The country is divided into 18 CPAs.  In 14 of these, there are 
two primes and in 4 (East London, West London, Birmingham and Manchester) there are 
three.  In total, there are 40 contracts allowing 26 experimental within-CPA comparisons. 
We have approached the research in two stages. The first stage was to establish the extent 
of variation between primes within CPAs.  The results of this analysis, Dorsett and Lucchino 
(2014), showed: 
 randomisation worked well; within each CPA, between-prime differences in the 
characteristics of participants were only ever slight  
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 provider allocation is important; within each CPA, there were significant differences 
across providers for all of the outcomes considered. 
This report details the result of the Stage 2 analysis.  The aim of the research is to 
understand the extent to which differences in the characteristics of primes and the service 
they deliver appear to be associated with variations in effectiveness.  We emphasise that 
these associations are not experimental and so cannot be taken to imply causal 
relationships.  Nevertheless, they still provide useful information to policy makers and in the 
conclusion of the report we consider what it is possible to learn from the results. 
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3  An overview of the Work Programme 
Everyone receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) or Employment Support Allowance (ESA) 
can access the Work Programme at a specified point in their claim, depending on their 
circumstances. Some claimants must join the Work Programme while for others 
participation is voluntary. Claimants volunteering for the Work Programme are advised by 
Jobcentre Plus whether that is the most appropriate option for them.  Conditions for access 
to the Work Programme by claimant group are summarised in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2. 
Table 3-1 Work Programme Referral points and participation requirements 
Mandatory customers Participant  Entry/Access Point  Payment 
Group 
JSA claimants aged 18 to 24.  Required from 9 months  PG 1 
JSA claimants aged 25 and over.  Required from 12 months  PG 2 
JSA 18 year old NEET participants.  Required from 3 months  PG 3 
JSA Repeaters.  Required from 3 months  PG 3 
JSA Ex-IB participants.  Required from 3 months  PG 4 
JSA Early Access participants.  Optional from 3 months  PG 3 
JSA Prison Leaver  Required from Day One of release 
from prison or the first date of 
claim if made within 13 weeks  
PG 9 
Employment and Re-offending Pilot  Required from Day One of release 
from prison or the first date of 
claim if made within 13 weeks 
PG 9 
ESA (IR) WRAG with 3 Month Prognosis.  Required from WCA Outcome  PG 6 
ESA (IR) WRAG with 6 Month Prognosis.  Required from WCA Outcome  PG 6 
ESA (IR) Ex-IB WRAG with 3 Month 
Prognosis.  
Required from WCA Outcome  PG 7 
ESA (IR) Ex-IB WRAG with 6 Month 
Prognosis.  
Required from WCA Outcome  PG 7 
Existing ESA (IR) WRAG with 3 or 6 Month 
Prognosis.  
Mandatory from 10/9/12  PG 6 
ESA (IR) WRAG with 12 Month Prognosis.  Mandatory from 12 Nov 2012  PG 5 
WP ESA Mandatory (IR) WRAG 12mth  Required from WCA Outcome  PG 6 
WP ESA Mandatory (IR) WRAG 18mth  Required from WCA Outcome  PG 7 
WP ESA Mandatory (IR) WRAG 24mth  Required from WCA Outcome  PG 7 
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Table 3-2 Work Programme Referral points and participation requirements 
Voluntary customers Participant  Entry/Access Point  PG  
IS participants.  Optional from benefit entitlement  PG 8  
IB participants.  Optional  PG 8  
ESA (IR) WRAG (with Youngest 
Child Under 5 OR Full-Time Carer) 
with 3 or 6 Month Prognosis.  
Optional from WCA outcome  PG 6  
ESA (IR) Ex-IB WRAG (with 
Youngest Child Under 5 OR Full-
Time Carer) with 3 or 6 Month 
Prognosis.  
Optional from WCA outcome  PG 7  
ESA (IR) WRAG (with Youngest 
Child Under 5 OR Full-Time Carer) 
with 12+ Months prognosis.  
Optional from WCA outcome  PG 5  
ESA (c) WRAG participants.  Optional from WCA outcome  PG 5  
ESA (c) WRAG (with Youngest Child 
Under 5 OR Full-Time Carer).  
Optional from WCA outcome  PG 5  
ESA (IR) Support Group.  Optional from WCA outcome  PG 6  
ESA (IR) Ex-IB Support Group.  Optional from WCA outcome  PG 7  
ESA (c) Support Group.  Optional from WCA outcome  PG 6  
ESA (c) Ex-IB Support Group.  Optional from WCA outcome  PG 7  
ESA Credit Only.  Optional from WCA outcome  PG 5  
ESA Voluntary (IR) WRAG 18mth  Optional from WCA outcome  PG 7  
Pension Credit Claimants.  Optional from 12 months (claiming benefits)  PG 2  
Pension Credit Claimants with Health 
Conditions.  
Optional from benefit entitlement  PG 5  
Employment and Re-offending Pilot  Required from Day One of release from 
prison or the first date of claim if made within 
13 weeks – Provider paid more to give extra  
PG 9  
JSA Benefit Cap  If impacted by benefit cap then can go from 
3 months  
PG 3  
 
Individuals referred to the Work Programme are assigned to one of the two or three primes 
operating within their CPA.  Assignment is on a random basis, with the number of referrals 
shared equally by claimant group and payment group (PG) between Prime providers 
The Work Programme: factors associated with differences in the relative effectiveness of prime providers  
 
17 
 
operating in the CPA. Table 3-3 provides a list of contracts, showing which primes operate 
in each CPA.  It also shows the number of referrals received up until 30 September 2014.1 
Table 3-3 List of prime provider contracts 
CPA PROVIDER REFERRALS 
IN DATASET 
East of England Ingeus UK LTD 59,263 
East of England Seetec 57,056 
East Midlands A4E Ltd 58,478 
East Midlands Ingeus UK LTD 60,329 
West London Ingeus UK LTD 34,971 
West London 
Maximus Employment 
UK Ltd 34,002 
West London Reed in Partnership 33,539 
East London A4E Ltd 47,308 
East London 
Careers Development 
Group 47,096 
East London Seetec 46,691 
North East Avanta Enterprise Ltd 51,860 
North East Ingeus UK LTD 50,811 
Merseyside, Halton, Cumbria and Lancashire A4E Ltd 56,295 
Merseyside, Halton, Cumbria and Lancashire Ingeus UK LTD 56,372 
Manchester, Cheshire and Warrington Avanta Enterprise Ltd 38,090 
Manchester, Cheshire and Warrington G4S 38,178 
Manchester, Cheshire and Warrington Seetec 37,513 
Scotland Ingeus UK LTD 80,419 
Scotland Working Links 79,474 
Thames Valley, Hampshire and Isle of Wight A4E Ltd 33,000 
Thames Valley, Hampshire and Isle of Wight 
Maximus Employment 
UK Ltd 33,246 
Surrey, Sussex & Kent Avanta Enterprise Ltd 40,451 
Surrey, Sussex & Kent G4S 41,040 
Devon and Cornwall, Dorset and Somerset Prospects Services Ltd 23,908 
Devon and Cornwall, Dorset and Somerset Working Links 24,091 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Swindon, West of 
England JHP Group Ltd 22,104 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Swindon, West of 
England Rehab Jobfit 22,008 
                                                          
1
 DWP announced in the summer 2014 that it would terminate the contract with Newcastle College Group within 12 
months. At the time of the latest data used in this analysis, October 2014, the Newcastle College Group had not yet 
been replaced. We expect the announcement of the termination will have very little effect on the analysis. 
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CPA PROVIDER REFERRALS 
IN DATASET 
 
Wales Rehab Jobfit 44,618 
Wales Working Links 45,231 
Birmingham and Solihull, the Black Country EOS-Works Ltd 38,732 
Birmingham and Solihull, the Black Country 
Newcastle College 
Group 37,104 
Birmingham and Solihull, the Black Country Pertemps 37,800 
Coventry, Warwickshire, Staffordshire and the 
Marches ESG 31,344 
Coventry, Warwickshire, Staffordshire and the 
Marches Serco Ltd 31,608 
West Yorkshire 
Business Employment 
Services 39,068 
West Yorkshire Ingeus UK LTD 40,291 
South Yorkshire A4E Ltd 25,026 
South Yorkshire Serco Ltd 25,213 
North East Yorkshire and the Humber G4S 23,711 
North East Yorkshire and the Humber 
Newcastle College 
Group 23,098 
Following referral to a Work Programme provider, the provider is responsible for contacting 
that person to discuss the programme and begin planning the steps needed to support 
them into sustained employment. Once this activity has taken place, the provider registers 
an attachment to the Work Programme. Individuals remain on the Work Programme for two 
years and can only be referred and attached once during this period. 
A small proportion of claimants sign off benefit prior to being attached. Typically, under 2% 
do not attach.  Among the others, attachment is within 17 days of referral, on average. 
Primes are paid according to the results they achieve. Payments are primarily for getting 
participants into sustained employment; there are no payments for job entry.  Only one Job 
Outcome payment can be paid per participant during the two years they are on the Work 
Programme. This payment will be made after either three or six months, of continuous or 
cumulative employment, depending on Payment Group. Following a Job Outcome 
payment, Sustainment payments are paid for every subsequent four week period in 
continuous employment, for up to two years.  Participants complete the Work Programme 
after 104 weeks or when the maximum number of Sustainment payments have been made.  
The timescales for achieving a Job Outcome payment and Sustainment payment differ 
according to the payment group to which the participant is assigned by Jobcentre Plus 
when they are referred to the programme. These timescales and the maximum number of 
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Sustainment payments which can be paid for each payment group are shown in Table 3-4. 
The payment of Job Outcomes and Sustainment payments is subject to post-payment 
validation.   
Payment amounts are also shown.  These vary by payment group, reflecting differences in 
the anticipated difficulty in achieving positive outcomes.   There are two additional points 
not obvious from the table.  First, attachment fees declined over time and disappeared 
altogether after year 3.  The year 2 attachment fee was 75% of the year 1 amount.  The 
year 3 attachment fee was 50% of the year 1 amount.  Second, at the time of bidding, prime 
providers were invited to offer discounts on the Job Outcome payments.  Table 3-4 shows 
the maximum amount payable but there was variation across providers in the agreed size 
of these payments. 
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Table 3-4 Payment structure by payment group 
Payment 
group: 
Customer group 
Job outcome 
paid week: 
Sustainment  
payment (4-
weekly) from: 
Sustainment: 
maximum 
amount of 4 
weekly 
payments: 
Year 1 
attachment 
fee (£) 
Job outcome 
fee (£ 
maximum) 
Sustainment 
payment (£) 
1 JSA 18-24 26 30 13 400 1200 170 
2 JSA 25+ 26 30 13 400 1200 215 
3 JSA early access 13 17 20 400 1200 250 
4 JSA ex-IB 13 17 20 400 1200 250 
5 ESA volunteers 13 17 20 400 1000 115 
6 
New ESA 
claimants 
13 17 20 600 1200 235 
7 ESA ex-IB 13 17 26 600 3500 370 
8 
IB/IS (England 
only) 
13 17 13 400 1000 145 
9 JSA prison leavers 26 30 20 400 1200 200 
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4 Data and measures of outcomes and 
service delivery 
4.1 Outcomes 
Administrative data on individuals participating in the Work Programme were provided by 
DWP. These data detail the circumstances for each of the 1,655,097 individuals referred to 
the Work Programme between June 2011 and September 2014, and track their outcomes 
until December 2014. This includes CPA and provider information and dates of referral, 
attachment, and any payments made to the provider.  
This dataset also includes information on the claimant's characteristics, such as the 
claimant type, payment group, gender, age, health and disabilities, qualification levels, 
ethnicity and previous occupation. The tables in Annex A present the distribution of these 
characteristics in the overall Work Programme population as well as broken down by high 
level Payment Group. As the tables show, data are complete for most characteristics. 
Qualification levels are an exception to this, as these are either missing or not known for 
56% of the sample. Around 6% of individuals in the sample do not report a previous 
occupation. This is predominantly among individuals on disability benefits. Around 5% of 
individuals do not report their ethnicity.  
A small number of data observations contain possibly contradictory information. 
Specifically, 2,251 individuals are reported as being in the JSA 18-24 year old payment 
group, but are aged 25 or over; and 2,038 individuals aged 25 or over are reported as being 
in the JSA 18-24 payment group. These individuals represent 0.25% of the sample and 
were dropped. 
DWP also provided administrative data on: 
 the full benefit history of all individuals who participated in the program over the 
above-mentioned period, followed forward until December 2014 
 employment spells for all participants over the same period.  
All three datasets were merged using a unique and anonymous identifier. Only four pairs of 
individuals with a duplicate identifier were found in the 1,655,097 Work Programme records, 
and one arbitrarily selected case from each pair was dropped. A further 367 records 
showed a unique identifier of 1 and were dropped.  
These records were matched then to the National Benefit Database (NBD) data, with a 
99.92% success rate. Only 6,143 individuals (0.37% of the sample) were not matched.  
Possible reasons for this very slight failure to match to NBD data include: a time lag in 
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logging ex-offenders onto the NBD; having been in prison long enough to not have any 
benefit record since 1999; lower engagement with Jobcentre Plus; and errors in the data. 
Data on Work Programme participants were matched to HMRC data on their employment 
since referral. 1,497,976 individuals were matched, delivering a match rate of 90.5%. 
Individuals not matched either had no employment records or had employment spells only 
before their referral to the Work Programme. It was necessary to carry out a number of data 
cleaning operations on the employment data. A large number of end dates were missing 
(indicated by an end date in December 2099). Around 82% of these were followed by spells 
with a later start date. We interpret this as implying that the end date is missing rather than 
the spell being ongoing. We set these to the end of the tax year during which the 
employment spell started. The remaining 18% of spells were not followed by any 
subsequent spell. Almost half of these had a start date of 2014, suggesting they are likely to 
be ongoing spells. Their end date was set to a date in the near future (specifically, the end 
the 2014/15 tax year). The remaining spells had earlier start dates and were assumed to 
have genuine missing end dates. These were set to the end of the relevant tax year. Other 
minor cleaning operations include dropping spells with dates in the far future (but not 
December 2099) or the distant past. These amendments inevitably make assumptions that 
may not be entirely correct. However, it is important to note that, as individuals are 
randomly assigned to providers, measurement error will be balanced across these, and will 
not bias inter-provider comparisons.  
Using the above data, we construct the following outcome measures for each individual in 
our sample: 
 Whether off benefit 12/18/24 months after referral (source: NBD) 
 Whether employed 12/18/24 months after referral (source: HMRC) 
 Whether there has been a job outcome payment within 12/18/24 months of referral 
(source: Work Programme Administrative Database) 
 Whether there has been a sustainment payment within 12/18/24 months of referral 
(source: Work Programme Administrative Database) 
4.2 Characterising aspects of service delivery 
Our ability to characterise the nature of the service offered by primes is dependent on the 
data available.  We were able to draw on three sources: 
 Details on the financial discounts offered by prime providers at the time of bidding to 
DWP to win the contracts to provide the service 
 Information provided by DWP on the volume of referrals to each subcontractor in the 
supply chain.  This is provided on a monthly basis, separately for each contract. 
 A survey of Work Programme participants, which asks respondents about their 
experience of the Work Programme.  
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From these sources, we identified numerous measures that could potentially be included in 
the model.  However, as discussed in the Stage 1 report, the fact that there are only a small 
number of experimental impact estimates means that it is not possible to include all 
variables of potential interest.  Furthermore, some characteristics, while potentially 
important influences on overall effectiveness, may not vary sufficiently across providers to 
allow the question of relative effectiveness to be examined.  The variables that we consider 
in the main analysis are described below. 
4.3 Payment amounts   
Providers were encouraged to offer discounts on the Job Outcome payments.  These 
discounts could vary by year and by payment group.  The consequence of the discounts 
was that providers differed in the amount of revenue each referral could potentially attract. 
We assess the relevance of discounts by considering a variable for the total potential 
revenue for each individual. This is calculated as the job outcome fee (where providers can 
offer discounts) plus the sustainment payment multiplied by the maximum number of 
sustainment payments possible (which is fixed by payment group). 
4.4 The nature of the supply chain 
Primes all have supply chains of subcontractors but vary in their use of them.  
Subcontractors in tier one of the supply chains are responsible for delivering the end-to-end 
process or a specific element of the service, such as job-brokering.  These partners are 
usually paid by results. Second tier organisations work on a call-off basis, as and when a 
prime provider judges a participant could benefit from that organisation’s help.  The 
voluntary and community sector are represented at all levels of Work Programme delivery 
i.e. as prime providers and in tiers one and two of prime providers’ supply chains. 
The referrals data provided by DWP allow us to see how much use has been made of 
subcontractors in practice.  There are limitations to these data.  For instance, there is no 
distinction by payment group, nor do we know how many participants the referrals relate to, 
since individuals may be referred on by primes more than once.  Nevertheless, it is the best 
available information to characterise how primes tend to distribute work.  We break down 
the total number of referrals into four categories to identify how impacts may vary with 
sectoral composition of the effective supply chain. 
 % referrals self-delivered, by year 
 % referrals passed to private sector subcontractors, by year 
 % referrals passed to public sector subcontractors, by year 
 % referrals passed to voluntary sector subcontractors, by year 
We also construct a measure of the sector of the prime. Most primes are privately owned, 
but a minority are fully or partially controlled by the voluntary or public sector entities. We 
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therefore construct a dummy variable indicating the primes where the 'Provider is not 100% 
private sector'. 
Providers also vary in the use they made of specialist and end-to-end subcontractors.  We 
capture the extent of this through the following two variables: 
 % referrals passed to specialist subcontractors, by year 
 % referrals passed to end to end subcontractors, by year 
Lastly, we use the referrals data to construct a measure of competition within the suppliers 
associated with a prime:   
 Herfindahl index of supply chain, by year 
4.5 Nature of service provided 
From the survey of participants, it was possible to characterise different aspects of how 
individuals experienced the Work Programme.  The responses from participants do not 
distinguish between prime providers and subcontractors.  However, since each surveyed 
individual’s prime provider is known, the data can be used to construct contract-level 
summary measures of individuals’ experiences. 
We identified the most appropriate variables to consider by applying two criteria. Firstly, to 
ensure a sufficient sample size, we only considered responses to questions that were 
asked to all or at least a large majority of the survey respondents. Secondly, we checked 
that the variables under consideration varied sufficiently across providers to allow the 
question of relative effectiveness to be examined.  We did so by regressing each service 
variable on a full set of contract dummies and, separately, on CPA dummies. This second 
regression is a restricted version of the first.  We tested whether this restriction was rejected 
statistically.  This amounts to a test of within-CPA provider variation.  We selected variables 
where this test had a p-value below 10% (suggesting statistically significant variation). 
The result of this process was that we selected four measures to capture the mode and 
intensity of the service, as listed below. Survey respondents were asked to identify all the 
channels of communication used by the provider. From these responses, we were able to 
construct variables indicating the percentage of customers contacted through a given 
communication channel:  
 Mode of contact: % via group meeting 
 Mode of contact: % via telephone 
 Mode of contact: % via text 
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and another variable capturing the frequency of contact:  
 number of times provider in contact with customers. 
We also selected six measures to capture the nature of support/advice: 
 % receiving assessment of skills 
 % drawing up an action plan 
 % receiving training in maths, reading, writing 
 % participating in work experience placement or voluntary work 
 % receiving advice for setting up own business 
 % receiving financial advice. 
Lastly, studies have pointed to the impact of sanctions, sometimes suggesting that they 
increase benefit exits but not necessarily employment entry. To explore the possible 
influence of provider warnings of sanctions, we construct a measure of the use of such 
cautionary messages from the survey of Work Programme participants. Importantly, 
providers have a legal obligation to inform all claimants of possible sanctions if they fail to 
comply with Work Programme activities. However, there is considerable variation in the 
incidence of survey participants at each provider responding affirmatively to the question 
“Did any of your Work Programme advisers tell you that you had to do something and you 
could be at risk of losing all or part of your benefit if you did not do it?”. This could be due to 
differential use of mandation by providers or imperfect recall by survey participants. As 
such, we interpret this as a proxy for the use of warnings by providers or the intensity of 
such warnings. Our analysis therefore includes: 
 % stating they were warned of risk of benefit cut 
4.6 Descriptive statistics on service characteristics 
 
Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 present some descriptive statistics on service characteristics. 
Table 4-1 presents characteristics that vary across contracts, while Table 4-2 presents 
those characteristics that vary both across contracts and contract years. We present 
selected percentiles of the distribution of observed values for each service characteristic. 
The main point to note here is that there is considerable variation in the value of each of the 
characteristics. In Section 5 we decompose this variation into within- vs. between-CPA 
variation in service provision. 
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Table 4-1 Variation in service provision, contract level 
Variable N Percentile 
 
Obs 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Mode of contact: % via group meeting 40 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.53 0.56 
Mode of contact: % via telephone 40 0.45 0.49 0.52 0.57 0.61 
Mode of contact: % via text 40 0.1 0.12 0.2 0.25 0.34 
Number of times provider in contact with 
customer 
40 7.71 8.63 9.76 11.36 12.77 
Support type: % receiving assessment of 
your skills 
40 0.26 0.29 0.33 0.38 0.44 
Support type: % drawing up an action 
plan 
40 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.51 0.56 
Support type: % receiving training in 
maths reading writing 
40 0.07 0.1 0.11 0.16 0.18 
Support type: % work experience 
placement or voluntary work 
40 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.18 
Support type: % advice for setting up 
your own business 
40 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.18 
Support type: % Financial advice 40 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.27 
% stating they were warned of risk of 
benefit cut 
40 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.73 0.77 
Provider not 100% private sector 40 0 0 0 0 1 
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Table 4-2 Variation in service provision, contract-year level 
Variable Year N Percentile 
 
 
Obs 10th 25th Median 75th 90th 
% self-delivered - Annual (DWP) 1 40 0 0.42 0.56 0.7 0.73 
% self-delivered - Annual (DWP) 2 39 0 0.41 0.56 0.7 0.82 
% self-delivered - Annual (DWP) 3 35 0 0.4 0.57 0.7 0.77 
% referrals to private sector subs - Annual (DWP) 1 40 0.05 0.14 0.23 0.36 0.61 
% referrals to private sector subs - Annual (DWP) 2 39 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.34 0.61 
% referrals to private sector subs - Annual (DWP) 3 35 0.03 0.11 0.24 0.33 0.61 
% referrals to public sector subs - Annual (DWP) 1 40 0 0 0.03 0.08 0.15 
% referrals to public sector subs - Annual (DWP) 2 39 0 0 0.02 0.07 0.17 
% referrals to public sector subs - Annual (DWP) 3 35 0 0 0.03 0.08 0.17 
% referrals to voluntary sector subs - Annual (DWP) 1 40 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.41 
% referrals to voluntary sector subs - Annual (DWP) 2 39 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.26 0.42 
% referrals to voluntary sector subs - Annual (DWP) 3 35 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.26 0.46 
% referrals to specialist subs - Annual (DWP) 1 40 0 0 0 0.01 0.04 
% referrals to specialist subs - Annual (DWP) 2 39 0 0 0 0.01 0.05 
% referrals to specialist subs - Annual (DWP) 3 35 0 0 0 0.01 0.06 
% referrals to end to end subs - Annual (DWP) 1 40 0.2 0.27 0.35 0.52 1 
% referrals to end to end subs - Annual (DWP) 2 39 0.14 0.24 0.35 0.54 1 
% referrals to end to end subs - Annual (DWP) 3 35 0.15 0.24 0.31 0.46 1 
Herfindahl index of supply chain - Annual (DWP) 1 40 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.24 0.39 
Herfindahl index of supply chain - Annual (DWP) 2 39 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.33 
Herfindahl index of supply chain - Annual (DWP) 3 35 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.38 
Total revenue achievable from individual (£100s) 1 356 32.85 37.14 55.4 65.04 130.2 
Total revenue achievable from individual (£100s) 2 354 32.5 36.14 54.4 64.04 128.7 
Total revenue achievable from individual (£100s) 3 349 29.35 33.17 51.6 61.6 108.67 
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5 Econometric approach 
The aim of the project is to understand how provider characteristics or actions can affect 
performance. The Phase 1 report showed that there are significant differences between 
providers in their effectiveness.  Providers have the freedom to tailor the support they offer 
to meet the needs of individual participants. In this section, we present the methodological 
approach we use to explore whether there are particular characteristics of the providers or 
the support they offer that are associated with higher performance. 
5.1 Identification strategy 
Formally, we can think of the simple case in which the outcome for individual   in CPA   
referred to provider  , is determined by:   
Equation 1 
 
        
      
        
                  
Outcomes will depend on the circumstances in each CPA,   . Examples of these could be 
the strength of the local labour market or the sectoral composition of the local economy. 
Individual characteristics,     , such as labour market history or qualification levels will also 
influence outcomes. Finally, the above equation allows for providers to affect outcomes, 
through their service characteristics (   ). Outcomes are also influenced by unobserved 
factors, which we can decompose into a CPA component (  ), a contract component (   ), 
and an individual component (    ).
2 
Individuals are randomly assigned to providers within each CPA. Information systems 
governing the process of randomisations were fully operational from 30th January 2012. 
Starting from this date, the allocation tool identified, on a daily basis and for each payment 
group within each CPA, the provider which had the fewest referrals to date, relative to their 
contracted market share. All referrals for that day would go to that provider.3 Other than in a 
limited number of clerical cases and mandatory ESA (IR) WRAG 12 month prognosis 
cases, opportunities for human intervention are minimal.  
Prior to 30 January 2012, the information systems only displayed allocations to providers by 
Claimant Group (rather than Payment Group) and at the Job Centre Plus district level 
(rather than the CPA). The same principle as above was then applied to the allocation to 
providers but was carried out by advisers and was calculated using data at these lower 
levels.  The Phase 1 report confirmed that randomisation delivered balanced customer 
                                                          
2
 We refer to "contract" as a provider in a specific CPA.  
3
 Up to 5th August 2013, providers had equal market shares within each CPA, meaning that the day's referrals would 
simply go to the provider with fewer referrals to date. 
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profiles across providers under both allocation mechanisms (please see Annex B for 
summary of phase 1 analysis). 
Random assignment of individuals allows experimental identification of relative provider 
effectiveness as within-CPA provider differences in outcomes. In a pooled model across all 
CPAs, all that is required is to introduce CPA fixed effects that capture the influence of both 
observed (    and unobserved (  ) factors which are common at CPA level.  In other words, 
differing customer composition across providers in different CPAs and/or prevailing 
conditions across CPAs cannot bias our estimates of relative provider effectiveness. 
Secondly, randomisation ensures the sets of individuals assigned to each provider exhibit 
balanced profiles across observable characteristics. Importantly, as we discuss in Annex B, 
such balanced profiles also lend support to the (untestable) assertion that the groups are 
balanced over unobservable characteristics. Once CPA fixed effects are netted out, 
randomisation guarantees that the residual variance in      and      is uncorrelated with 
provider service characteristics    . Indeed, controlling for the effect of individual 
characteristics is not strictly necessary to estimate relative provider effectiveness, though 
doing so will tend to increase the precision of such estimates.  Within-CPA comparisons 
across providers will therefore also not be biased by compositional differences in customers 
across these providers. Additionally, they will not be biased should the effect of individual 
characteristics vary by CPA. 
The aim of Stage 2 is to unpack these relative provider differentials and understand which 
provider characteristics (   ) are associated with higher impacts. Identifying the causal 
effect of a given service characteristic on outcomes is however much more difficult. On the 
one hand, by comparing within-CPA differences in outcomes across providers, this setup is 
robust to endogenous correlations of service provision in response to CPA circumstances 
or the profile of individuals in each CPA, or indeed the interaction between the two. For 
example, we need not be concerned if basic Maths and English training is more likely to be 
administered in CPAs with strong service sectors. However, Equation 1 highlights the 
fundamental limitation to identifying causal effects of service characteristics. Essentially, 
this would require having a correctly specified model in which unobserved provider service 
characteristics (   ) are not correlated with the observed service characteristics that we 
include in our estimations. This is the challenge of any observational study. In the specific 
context under study, omission of relevant service characteristics from the model may bias 
the coefficient on variables included in the specification. This is an important caveat worth 
keeping in mind given the limitations in the available data on service provision, as well as 
the need to keep the model parsimonious. Nevertheless, the estimations can aim to 
uncover robust correlations across service provision and impacts that are likely to shed 
important light on optimal forms of intervention. 
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5.2 Inference 
Aside from the issue of bias, the estimation of correct standard errors faces two additional 
challenges in this context. Firstly, given the complex error structure, careful thought must be 
given to what the appropriate correction to standard error calculation is. Secondly, and 
more importantly, despite drawing on a very large number of individual observations, the 
variation we are most interested in exploiting only occurs across the 40 provider contracts 
across the 18 CPAs.  With a larger number of contracts, this could be addressed by 
clustering standard errors at the contract, or even CPA, level (Liang & Zeger, 1986). 
However, the relatively small number of contracts may mean that conventional (asymptotic) 
calculations of standard errors when estimating the model on the full individual dataset may 
be biased. When the number of clusters is small, correct standard errors may be obtained 
using two-step estimators considered by Donald and Lang (2007) and, more recently, by 
Bryan and Jenkins (2013). To guide the choice of the most appropriate approach, we ran a 
Monte Carlo simulation using 2,000 random draws from the above error structure and 
tested this over seven different estimation methods.4 We identified the Donald and Lang 
(2007) approach with clustering at CPA level in the second stage as providing an unbiased 
and efficient estimate of the standard error, and we adopt this as our selected approach 
across the work in Stage 2. 
5.3 Estimation 
Drawing on the above discussion, our specific estimation approach is as follows.  The 
equation we wish to estimate is the following: 
Equation 2 
            
           
                  
There are   CPAs and the model allows for a CPA level effect,   . Individual 
characteristics,     , will also influence outcomes, and their effect is allowed to vary across 
CPAs through an interaction with all CPA dummies. Monte Carlo simulations in Donald and 
Lang (2007) indicate this flexibility allows for a cautious approach to inference. This 
minimises the risk of incorrectly identifying correlations as statistically significant.  
Following Donald and Lang 2007, Equation 2 is estimated in two stages. The first stage 
regresses, within each CPA, individual outcomes on individual characteristics and dummies 
                                                          
4
 Specifications tested were: OLS without clustering; OLS clustering at contract level; OLS clustering at CPA level; Donald & Lang 
(2007) approach with 40 contract groups, no clustering in the second stage; Donald & Lang (2007) approach with 40 contract groups, 
clustering at CPA level in the second stage; random effects at contract level; multilevel model with level 2 defined at the contract 
level. 
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for the contracts within the CPA. Together, this set of regressions identifies the parameters 
of the following equation:  
                  
           
From this, we can extract the mean and standard error of the 40 provider contracts 
dummies. The coefficient on each dummy is the mean outcome for that contract, adjusted 
for individual characteristics.  The second stage involves regressing these estimated 
coefficients on service level variables as follows: 
Equation 3 
 ̂          
            
where     are the service level characteristics and the full set of CPA dummies (    is 
included to absorb any CPA level effects and errors. Since the    error components are 
CPA wide, and in line with the results from our Monte Carlo simulation, we cluster the 
second stage standard errors at CPA level. 
5.4 Subgroup analysis 
Here we discuss the set-up where we allow for service characteristics to have a 
heterogeneous effect across population subgroups. The above identification strategy 
follows through, with one modification: rather than comparing outcomes within-CPA only, 
we compare outcomes within-CPA-within-subgroup. For example, we would compare the 
outcomes across providers in CPA   for females only. Because individuals are not 
randomised to providers conditional on subgroup, the profile of the subgroup members 
across providers may not be balanced. At the same time, the allocation process is 
independent of subgroup, meaning that there is no reason to expect systematic imbalance 
either. Overall, so long as the cell size is sufficiently large, randomisation should hold at the 
subgroup level too. Controlling explicitly for a number of observed individual characteristics 
will also improve the estimate of relative provider effectiveness. These comparisons can 
then be related to service provision in a way that allows for their correlation with impacts to 
vary across subgroups.  
Formally, the model we would like to estimate is the following:  
                 
            
                   
We focus on within-CPA-within-subgroup comparisons by allowing for a CPA-subgroup 
level effect,    . As before, individual characteristics (other than the characteristic that 
defines the subgroup) will also influence outcomes, and their effect is allowed to vary 
across CPA-subgroup through an interaction with cell dummies,    . Service characteristics 
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(   ) are interacted with all levels of the subgroup variable (  ), thereby allowing a distinct 
correlation to be estimated for each subgroup. 
The first stage equation is as follows, with      estimating the covariate-adjusted mean 
outcome estimated on regressions for each CPA-subgroup: 
                      
           
The second stage then takes the form: 
Equation 4 
 ̂               
            
The estimated coefficient dummies from the first stage are regressed on service level 
characteristics (   ) and a full set of CPA-subgroup dummies. As above, we cluster the 
second stage at CPA level, in line with good practice of clustering at the highest relevant 
level (Cameron & Miller, 2013). 
5.5 Time-varying service provision 
In some cases, we will be interested in relating outcomes to provider service characteristics 
that are time-varying. An example of this is the percentage of cases referred to 
subcontractors each month. The above framework easily generalises to a framework with 
variation over time. Our overall equation is as follows: 
              
       
            
                         
The comparison of outcomes is now made within-CPA and by time period t. As above, this 
is achieved by dummies for such cells,    . The effect of individual characteristics is allowed 
to vary within each cell. The main departure is in the introduction of time-varying service 
characteristics,    , alongside time-invariant ones. Analogously, we decompose the provider 
level error into a fixed component (   ) and a time-varying one (    ). 
The first stage is estimated as usual, with cells determined by CPA-time: 
                     
           
The second stage is as follows: 
Equation 5 
 ̂            
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As with previous cases, CPA-time dummies allow us to identify the overall contribution of 
provider characteristics. In this case, however, as the effect of time-invariant characteristics 
is likely to be of less interest, it can be absorbed by contract-level fixed effects.  This 
isolates the estimation of the time-varying service characteristics,    . Naturally, any causal 
interpretation of these effects depends on the time-varying error (    ) being uncorrelated 
with the variable of interest. 
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6 Establishing service variation within 
CPAs 
The estimation strategy presented in the previous section seeks to relate within-CPA 
differences in outcomes across providers to within-CPA differences in service provision 
across the same providers. For this to be possible, there needs to be sufficient within-CPA 
variation in both these sets of data. This was partly the focus of the Stage 1 report, which 
established there were significant differences in the performance of providers within CPAs, 
as captured by differences in the outcomes of those individuals attached to them. This 
section establishes that there is enough variation in service provision across providers in 
the same CPA to ensure our estimations are indeed capable of identifying their correlations 
with outcomes, should these be present in the data.  
We can consider the level of provider services as being composed of a CPA element and a 
provider-in-CPA element: 
             
The interpretation of the former is that it represents the level at which providers within a 
given CPA tend to offer a specific form of support.  This is a mean across all providers in 
that CPA. The interpretation of the latter is that it represents the extent to which individual 
providers choose to offer this type of support at a lower or higher level than this. This latter 
variation is captured as the residual in a regression of the level of a service characteristic 
    on the full set of CPA dummies. Where service characteristics vary across contract 
years, we extract the residuals from a regression on a full set of CPA-by-year dummies. 
The F-test from the regression of     on these residuals can be interpreted as the test for 
whether this residual variance is statistically significant.5 
Table 6-1 below presents descriptive statistics on the extent of within-CPA variation in 
service characteristics. For example, relating the within-CPA standard deviation to the 
overall mean level of the service provision across CPAs (in the leftmost column) allows one 
to gauge the extent of this variation. Similarly, the range covered by the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of the distribution of the CPA-adjusted variation in service characteristics gives 
a sense of the breadth of this variation. Finally, the right-most column presents the p-value 
from the above-mentioned F-test indicating the statistical significance of this within-CPA 
variation. We therefore confirm that there is significant within-CPA variation in service 
characteristics across all the measures considered.   
                                                          
5
 Note that the function of this test is identical to that of the approach taken in Section 4.5 to choose measures 
calculated from the survey of Work Programme participants. For these measures, this test is partly redundant. In this 
Section, however, we apply this test to all service measures considered, not just those originating from the customer 
survey. 
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Table 6-1 Within-CPA variation in service characteristics 
Variable Mean 
Residual variance 
F test p-
value 
Std 
Dev. 
10th 
pctile 
90th 
pctile 
Number of times provider in contact with 
customer 
10.205 1.097 -1.241 1.691 0 
Mode of contact: % via group meeting 0.497 0.051 -0.064 0.064 0 
Mode of contact: % via telephone 0.525 0.043 -0.063 0.059 0 
Mode of contact: % via text 0.203 0.065 -0.076 0.075 0 
Support type: % receiving assessment of 
your skills 
0.349 0.044 -0.057 0.04 0 
Support type: % drawing up an action 
plan 
0.457 0.049 -0.059 0.059 0 
Support type: % receiving training in 
maths reading writing 
0.131 0.038 -0.05 0.045 0 
Support type: % work experience 
placement or voluntary work 
0.136 0.031 -0.048 0.048 0 
Support type: % advice for setting up 
own business 
0.112 0.037 -0.039 0.039 0 
Support type: % Financial advice 0.171 0.047 -0.059 0.059 0 
% stating they were warned of risk of 
benefit cut 
0.683 0.042 -0.048 0.047 0 
Provider not 100% private sector 0.197 0.285 -0.333 0.499 0 
% self-delivered - Annual (DWP) 0.496 0.202 -0.289 0.276 0 
% referrals to private sector subs - 
Annual (DWP) 
0.27 0.139 -0.161 0.183 0 
% referrals to public sector subs - Annual 
(DWP) 
0.056 0.052 -0.055 0.052 0 
% referrals to voluntary sector subs - 
Annual (DWP) 
0.178 0.106 -0.13 0.133 0 
% referrals to specialist subs - Annual 
(DWP) 
0.018 0.041 -0.023 0.028 0 
% referrals to end to end subs - Annual 
(DWP) 
0.425 0.208 -0.287 0.289 0 
Herfindahl index of supply chain - Annual 
(DWP) 
0.178 0.101 -0.149 0.148 0 
Total revenue achievable from individual 
(£100s) 
59.721 9.397 -1.807 3.443 0.04 
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7 Results 
7.1 Format of the results 
The results from the estimations come in a number of forms, which we outline in this 
subsection. At the most aggregate level, we estimate overall correlations between service 
characteristics and impacts across all participants. These are found in Table 7-1, where we 
present the estimated coefficient relating each of the service characteristics to the 4 types 
of outcomes considered. These are estimated using Equation 3 for contract level 
characteristics and Equation 5 for characteristics that vary by contract year. For each 
outcome, we present the association at 12, 18 and 24 months from referral. Note however 
that these are not estimated on the same underlying population, as outcomes at longer 
horizons are only observed for individuals referred to the Work Programme earlier in the 
contracts. Any comment on the relative magnitude of coefficients across these points in 
time would therefore rest on the assumption that the effect of service characteristics does 
not vary across cohorts of customers. The statistical significance of each coefficient is 
conveyed through colour-coding.  Light shading indicates statistical significance at the 10% 
level; dark shading, at the 5% level.  
The numbers in the table indicate the percentage point change in impacts as the service 
characteristic in question changes by one unit.  In the case of variables that are proportions 
(such as the proportion of individuals reporting group meetings), this is the equivalent to a 
change from 0% to 100%. In practice, levels of service characteristics tend to be clustered 
within narrower ranges.  To give a more realistic impression how impacts change, we show 
the impacts associated with moving from the level of service at the 25th percentile to the 
level of service at the 75th percentile.  Such a representation has an appeal since it conveys 
how impacts might vary as the level of service changes within a range that is not out of 
keeping with what is seen in practice. These estimates are found in Table 7-2. The 
statistical significance of each marginal effect is conveyed through colour-coding as in the 
previous table. 
Table 7-2 also offers a way to gauge how much of the variation in provider performance is 
statistically accounted for by the correlation with a given service characteristic. To that end, 
Table 7-2 displays the inter-quartile range in the dependent variable. This measures the 
difference in performance against a given outcome between providers ranking at the 25th 
and 75th positions in performance, after having netted out CPA and CPA-year effects. This 
is shown both for models that consider characteristics that are fixed at the contract level 
(top panel) and for models that look at characteristics that vary by contract and year 
(bottom panel). For example, looking at the top panel, the employment rate at 12 months of 
customers assigned to the provider at the 25th place performance ranking is 0.9 percentage 
points higher than the employment rate of customers assigned to the provider at the 75 th 
place performance ranking.  Comparing the inter-quartile marginal effects of a given service 
The Work Programme: factors associated with differences in the relative effectiveness of prime providers  
 
37 
 
characteristic with the range in the dependent variable provides a feel for the quantitative 
relevance of the correlation identified. 6  For example, the figure of 0.004 on ‘Mode of 
contact: % by telephone’ at the 12m employment outcome indicates that the employment 
rate of customers assigned to the provider at the 25th  percentile in the extent of use of 
telephone as a means of contact is 0.4 percentage points higher than the employment rate 
of customers assigned to the provider at the 75th   percentile in the extent of use of 
telephones. The variation in performance associated with variation in the use of telephone 
is therefore roughly half of the total variation attributable to provider service 
characteristics (0.004/0.009). 
Next, we estimate how these correlations vary across subgroups by interacting each 
service characteristic, independently, with sex, age bands and payment groups. This 
analysis identifies up to 16 coefficients 7  for each service characteristic, making it 
cumbersome to convey results through a table. Instead, we present these results visually in 
the extended set of charts included in Annex C. To further simplify the presentation, we 
consider the heterogeneity in impact across the 5 Customer Groups rather than 9 Payment 
Groups. These are: (1) JSA 18-24; (2) JSA 24+; (3) Other JSA; (4) New ESA; (5) Other 
ESA-IB. Finally, we consider only the 18 months outcome, again with the aim of making the 
presentation of results manageable while still capturing the broad nature of sub-group 
variation.   
Annex C consists of two sets of charts for each service characteristic considered. The first 
set plots the marginal effect of increasing the level of a given service characteristic for each 
sex, age and payment group. These estimates answer the question of how much the 
impact considered would change, for a given subgroup, as the service characteristic 
increases by an additional unit. In each chart, the marginal effects are enclosed in a 90% 
confidence interval and a red line is plotted at zero. This gives an immediate representation 
of whether each marginal effect is statistically different from zero. Each chart also includes 
the p-value for the test of the hypothesis that the marginal effects over all the levels in a 
given subgroup type are equal to each other. In other words, a p-value below 0.1 would 
suggest that there is a 10% statistically significant variation in the marginal effect across the 
given subgroup type (sex, age or payment groups).  
Importantly, this first set of charts cannot reveal the full dynamics of underlying effects. For 
example, there are a number of cases where the test statistic indicates there is variation in 
the marginal effects across subgroups, but the visual representation of these does not 
unambiguously identify which two or more subgroups determine this variation. To provide 
additional insight into this, we include a second set of charts reporting the coefficient from 
all estimated pairwise differences in marginal effects within age and Customer Groups that 
emerge as statistically significant. These tables are read as follows. Cells report the 
                                                          
6
 Note that the inter-quartile marginal effect may exceed the inter-quartile range in the dependent 
variable. This is driven by dynamics outside of the range considered. 
7
 2 sexes, 5 age bands and 9 payment groups. 
The Work Programme: factors associated with differences in the relative effectiveness of prime providers  
 
38 
 
difference in marginal effects of the row subgroup from the column subgroup. Cells report a 
value only where this difference is significant at the 10% level. 
It is important to note that these tests may appear not to agree with each other. For 
example, it is possible that, for a certain outcome, marginal effects for younger people could 
be statistically significant while those for older people are not, yet the hypothesis of similar 
marginal effect across ages cannot be rejected.  Alternatively, all marginal effects across 
subgroups could be not statistically different from zero, yet the overall test may reject the 
hypothesis that all marginal effects are equal to each other. The reason for these apparent 
inconsistencies is that each test hinges on a distinct test statistic. The practical 
interpretation of the results we will find for each service characteristic will therefore 
necessarily rely on an all-round consideration of the results for the full battery of tests.  
The results from our analysis speak directly to a number of important issues in relation to 
the effectiveness of support provided via the Work Programme. We discuss each of these 
in turn, highlighting what we see as the main findings. 
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Table 7-1 Aggregate correlations with impacts 
Service characteristic In employment, at: Job Outcome, within: 
Sustainment Payments, 
within: Off benefits, at: 
  12m 18m 24m 12m 18m 24m 12m 18m 24m 12m 18m 24m 
Mode of contact: % via group 
meeting 0.008 0.01 0.007 -0.006 0.005 0.025 0.002 0.011 0.017 0.02 0.014 0.014 
Mode of contact: % via 
telephone 0.049 0.053 0.043 0.022 0.036 0.051 0.037 0.045 0.047 -0.024 -0.019 -0.021 
Mode of contact: % via text -0.021 -0.007 -0.01 -0.051 -0.049 -0.044 -0.071 -0.059 -0.043 -0.013 -0.013 0.005 
Number of times provider in 
contact with customer 0.002 0.001 0 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0 0 -0.001 
Support type: % receiving 
assessment of your skills -0.025 -0.009 -0.012 -0.045 -0.064 -0.062 -0.011 -0.029 -0.027 -0.03 -0.02 -0.007 
Support type: % drawing up an 
action plan -0.031 -0.03 -0.009 -0.081 -0.112 -0.098 -0.078 -0.11 -0.086 -0.079 -0.051 -0.052 
Support type: % receiving 
training in maths reading 
writing -0.032 -0.012 -0.027 -0.033 -0.029 -0.022 -0.016 -0.011 0 -0.021 -0.009 0.003 
Support type: % work 
experience placement or 
voluntary work 0.031 0.062 0.048 0.008 -0.034 0.003 -0.031 -0.047 -0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 
Support type: % advice for 
setting up own business -0.005 0.017 0.009 0.016 0.008 0.023 0.068 0.073 0.06 0.067 0.058 0.087 
Support type: % Financial 
advice -0.004 0.017 0.002 -0.059 -0.07 -0.06 -0.037 -0.039 -0.03 0.015 0.019 0.039 
% stating they were warned of -0.034 -0.011 0.018 -0.149 -0.163 -0.15 -0.174 -0.187 -0.14 -0.062 -0.054 -0.038 
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risk of benefit cut 
Provider not 100% private 
sector -0.001 0 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
% cases dealt by private 
providers -0.004 -0.008 0.057 -0.052 -0.052 -0.12 -0.061 -0.019 0.025 0.007 0.023 -0.047 
Total revenue achievable from 
individual (£100s) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% self-delivered - Annual 
(DWP) 0.011 -0.018 0.032 -0.025 -0.035 -0.068 0.032 0.009 0.068 -0.027 -0.015 -0.029 
% referrals to private sector 
subs - Annual (DWP) -0.001 0.022 -0.006 0.029 0.045 0.051 -0.061 -0.009 -0.058 0.049 0.045 0.033 
% referrals to public sector 
subs - Annual (DWP) -0.109 -0.068 -0.095 0.041 0.017 0.14 0.114 0.061 0.162 0.096 -0.002 -0.043 
% referrals to voluntary sector 
subs - Annual (DWP) 0.01 0.04 -0.057 0.002 0.009 0.057 -0.022 -0.035 -0.166 -0.052 -0.052 0.041 
% referrals to specialist subs - 
Annual (DWP) -0.099 -0.12 -0.067 -0.035 -0.012 -0.054 -0.011 -0.113 -0.128 -0.122 0.029 0.212 
% referrals to end to end subs 
- Annual (DWP) -0.057 -0.005 -0.053 0 -0.007 0.022 -0.046 -0.036 -0.053 0.027 0.038 0.013 
Herfindahl index of supply 
chain - Annual (DWP) 0.006 -0.015 0.027 -0.031 -0.043 -0.074 -0.007 -0.02 0.034 -0.02 0.007 -0.026 
              
Significant 
at the 10% 
level 
Significant 
at the 5% 
level 
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Table 7-2 Inter-quartile marginal effects 
Service characteristic In employment, at: Job Outcome, within: 
Sustainment Payments, 
within: Off benefits, at: 
  12m 18m 24m 12m 18m 24m 12m 18m 24m 12m 18m 24m 
Mode of contact: % via group 
meeting 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0 0.002 0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Mode of contact: % via 
telephone 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
Mode of contact: % via text -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.01 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
Number of times provider in 
contact with customer 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.001 0 -0.002 
Support type: % receiving 
assessment of your skills -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
Support type: % drawing up 
an action plan -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.01 -0.013 -0.012 -0.009 -0.013 -0.01 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 
Support type: % receiving 
training in maths reading 
writing -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 0 
Support type: % work 
experience placement or 
voluntary work 0.001 0.003 0.002 0 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0 0 0 
Support type: % advice for 
setting up own business 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006 
Support type: % Financial 
advice 0 0.001 0 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 
% stating they were warned 
of risk of benefit cut -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 
Interquartile variance in 
dependent variable  0.009 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.01 0.012 
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             Total revenue achievable 
from individual (£100s) 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.002 0 0.001 0 0.002 0.001 0.001 
% self-delivered - Annual 
(DWP) 0.003 -0.005 0.009 -0.007 -0.01 -0.019 0.009 0.002 0.019 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 
% referrals to private sector 
subs - Annual (DWP) 0 0.005 -0.001 0.006 0.01 0.011 -0.013 -0.002 -0.013 0.011 0.01 0.007 
% referrals to public sector 
subs - Annual (DWP) -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 0.003 0.001 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.008 0 -0.004 
% referrals to voluntary 
sector subs - Annual (DWP) 0.002 0.008 -0.011 0 0.002 0.011 -0.004 -0.007 -0.032 -0.01 -0.01 0.008 
% referrals to specialist subs 
- Annual (DWP) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 0.002 
% referrals to end to end 
subs - Annual (DWP) -0.017 -0.001 -0.016 0 -0.002 0.007 -0.014 -0.011 -0.016 0.008 0.011 0.004 
Herfindahl index of supply 
chain - Annual (DWP) 0.001 -0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.01 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
Interquartile variance in 
dependent variable  0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 
              
Significant 
at the 10% 
level 
Significant 
at the 5% 
level 
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7.2 The nature of support 
 
Under this heading, we consider the frequency of contact, the mode of contact and the 
types of support offered. The latter are broadly defined. For example, we include among 
these whether providers inform claimants of the risk of losing all or part of their benefit in 
the case of non-compliance with the programme. 
The frequency of contact appears to have some positive association with outcomes. We 
estimate generally positive, and in some cases statistically significant, correlation with 
employment outcomes. Furthermore, despite the small absolute magnitude of the 
coefficients, we estimate some significant and in some cases substantial inter-quartile 
marginal effects. For instance, the incidence of Sustainment Payments at the 12 month  
point among individuals with providers who are at the 75th percentile are 1.4 percentage 
points higher than among those with providers who are at the 25th percentile. This indicates 
that the frequency of contact may be a particularly influential determinant for the 
effectiveness of service provisions, particularly for sustaining outcomes over the time. The 
subgroup analysis suggests that more frequent contact may be more important for females 
than males for Sustainment Payments, and for Customer Group 1 (JSA 18-24) when 
considering Job Outcomes or Sustainment Payments. 
We find some evidence that the mode of contact may matter for outcomes. Contacting 
claimants by telephone is associated with better employment outcomes overall. This is also 
seen in relatively substantial inter-quartile marginal effects. Effects on employment 
outcomes, Job Outcomes and Sustainment Payments appear to be stronger for younger 
claimants.  
The possible effect of other forms of contact appears to vary by claimant type. Despite no 
overall effect, we find that contact via group meetings is correlated with employment and 
Sustainment Payments for the ‘Other ESA-IB’ customer group. The plotted marginal effects 
indicate that contact by text may be less effective for this group, for JSA 18-24 and for older 
claimants in general. However, the pairwise comparisons do not support this result.  
As one would expect, the nature of the support offered is found to be associated with 
outcomes, though this is not always true. For example, offering work placements is 
uncorrelated with outcomes, whether overall or for specific subgroups.  
Among the types of support considered, we find the strongest evidence of a positive 
association between help starting a business and being off-benefit, including sizeable inter-
quartile marginal effects. This is particularly the case for prime-age JSA claimants, while the 
association turns negative for Customer Group 5 (Other ESA-IB). 
On the other hand, we find some evidence suggesting that help drawing up an action plan 
is associated with fewer Job Outcomes. While this is only marginally significant, there is 
more definite subgroup variation.  It appears to be more effective for older individuals and 
for non-JSA claimants.  
The Work Programme: factors associated with differences in the relative effectiveness of prime providers  
 
44 
 
Similarly, we find some indication that skills assessment is correlated with fewer Job 
Outcomes, on average. The subgroup analysis, however, reveals a more complex pattern. 
Again, the negative association is driven by JSA claimants rather than ESA claimants. 
There are also several statistically significant pairwise comparisons across age groups, but 
they do not reveal a clear overall pattern. 
English and maths training and provision of financial advice are not associated with 
outcomes overall. However, the subgroup analysis indicates that English and maths training 
may be somewhat less effective for older claimants and more effective for the Other ESA-IB 
Customer Group. Financial advice is associated with higher employment among the JSA 
18-24 group. 
Lastly, we find evidence of negative correlation between claimants stating they were 
warned that their benefits may be reduced if they fail to comply with Work Programme 
requirements and some outcomes. Specifically, we find a strong negative correlation with 
Job Outcomes and Sustainment Payments. The inter-quartile marginal effects are also 
sizeable. However, we find no association with employment or benefit receipt. It is 
important to bear in mind that providers are required to issue such warnings as a normal 
part of the operation of the Work Programme, whenever a claimant is mandated to an 
activity. This variable does not therefore reflect application of sanctions. 
There are a few possible reasons that may explain the apparent inconsistency in the 
correlation between claimants stating they were warned that their benefits may be reduced 
if they fail to comply with Work Programme requirements and the different outcomes. 
Firstly, the Job Outcomes and Sustainment Payment measures capture whether there have 
been any such events over a specified number of months, while the employment and off-
benefit measures capture an individual's circumstances in that same end-month. 
Additionally, while employment and off-benefit measures are calculated from administrative 
data, Job Outcomes and Sustainment Payment outcomes are reported by providers. It is 
therefore possible that customers of providers whose claimants report a higher rate of 
warnings have similar rates of employment as customers of providers with lower reported 
warning rates, but are more likely to disengage from providers and thereby reduce 
providers’ ability to evidence job outcome achievement. Looking at the subgroup analysis, 
the negative associations with Sustainment Payments are particularly strong among JSA 
claimants. For New ESA claimants, being informed of the consequences of non-compliance 
is associated with a greater reduction in their probability of being off benefit than for other 
types of claimant.   
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7.3 The nature of the supply chain 
 
Sectoral composition 
The second main area this analysis can speak to is in relation to the nature of the supply 
chain. In particular, we can explore its sectoral composition and the level of concentration 
(a proxy for competition).  
Hansmann (1980) argues that the absence of the profit motive implies that non-profit firms 
will deliver higher standards of quality in markets where this quality is hard to observe. In 
the context of the Work Programme, this could be interpreted as saying that both non-
profits and for-profits will maximise impact on easily verifiable outcomes such as Job 
Outcome and Sustainment Payments, but non-profits may perform better on outcomes that 
are less under scrutiny, such as benefit receipt, employment beyond Sustainment 
Payments milestones, or customer earnings in work. To the extent that we are able, we 
explore this possible relationship by testing the association of outcomes with the sector of 
the prime and the percentage of referrals to subcontractors outside the private sector. 
Overall, the results provide little evidence that the sectoral composition of the supply chain 
is systematically associated with negative or positive outcomes. The sector of the prime, 
the percentage of customers handled by the prime, and the percentage referred to 
subcontractors in the private, public or voluntary sector are not correlated with impacts 
overall. Additionally, none of the individual marginal effects for these characteristics is 
statistically different from zero for any of the subgroups. However, while keeping that in 
mind, the pairwise tests offer some insights. 
We find some evidence that the sector of the prime has different associations with impacts 
by Customer Group and to a lesser extent by age. The pairwise tests suggest that prime 
age, particularly JSA, claimants may do better than other groups when assigned to 
providers that are not 100% for-profit.  
While there is no evidence that the proportion of the caseload delivered by the prime is 
associated with impacts, there does appear to be an inverse-U-shaped variation in the 
impact of self-delivery over age. Claimants aged between 35 and 44 handled by a prime 
with a higher rate of self-delivery seem to achieve more Job Outcomes and Sustainment 
Payments relative to other age groups. On the other hand, claimants aged 45 and over do 
better than other age groups on the same outcomes when referrals to a private sector Tier 
1 provider are higher. Individuals in Customer Group 5 (Other ESA-IB) achieve lower 
employment outcomes when referrals to a public sector Tier 1 provider are higher.  
As a robustness check (not shown), we constructed an additional variable measuring the 
percentage of cases handled by a private sector provider. This is composed of all self-
delivered cases if the prime is private, plus any referrals to private subcontractors. Using 
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this simpler description of the sectoral composition of the supply chain, we still do not find 
any clear association with outcomes.  
Concentration of the supply chain 
We explore the relationship between outcomes and the concentration of the supply chain 
by using the Herfindahl index of the supply chain over the course of a contract year. We 
might expect that higher competition would introduce efficiencies and therefore improve 
outcomes. On the other hand, economies of scale and lower transaction costs may favour 
having fewer, larger subs. Finally, it could also be that the level of competition in the supply 
chain simply determines the allocation of rents between primes and subcontractors, but has 
no effect on outcomes.  
The results are most consistent with the latter hypothesis. We find no overall correlation 
between outcomes and the concentration of the supply chain. We also find very little 
evidence of variation by subgroup. The most notable exception to this is that we find that, 
where the supply chain is more concentrated, JSA 25+ claimants may achieve higher 
proportions off-benefit compared to other groups and that those aged under 24 achieve 
lower proportions off-benefit compared to other age groups. 
The role of specialist providers 
We also consider the relative use of specialist vs. end-to-end providers. Like with the 
sectoral composition of the supply chain, we find no association with outcomes overall, and 
none of the individual subgroup marginal effects is statistically different from zero. However, 
the pairwise tests reveal some patterns. There is some evidence that older claimants 
achieve higher Job Outcome and Sustainment payments if assigned to a prime that makes 
greater use of end-to-end providers. On the other hand, a large number of pairwise test 
results indicate that the prime’s use of specialist providers is associated with levels of Job 
Outcomes and Sustainment Payment that increase with age. The use of specialist 
providers is also associated with lower employment outcomes among the JSA 18-24 
Customer Group and higher proportions off-benefit among the New ESA Customer Group. 
The role of payment levels 
Finally, our analysis speaks to the very relevant question of whether higher payments to 
providers are associated with higher outcomes. The importance of this is obvious, given 
pressure on programmes to deliver value for money. At the same time, all else equal, 
higher discounts may cause providers to reduce the intensity of the service to maintain 
profit margins, thereby likely delivering lower outcomes. Alternatively, it could be that 
providers vary in their productivity and, at the contracting stage, see the quantity to be 
provided (for example, number of Job Outcomes) as fixed or at least largely outside of their 
control, and prefer to compete on prices. Under this scenario, the contracting mechanism 
would allow DWP to price-discriminate and extract all or most of the producer surplus. 
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Under this hypothesis, outcomes across providers would not be correlated with total 
revenue payable for each individual. 
Our results would appear to be consistent with this latter hypothesis. We find no association 
of outcomes with total potential revenue from each individual, and we find no evidence of 
subgroup marginal effects that are statistically different from zero.  The pairwise tests also 
confirm that there is little evidence of the associations with outcomes differing by subgroup. 
This is notable considering that it is precisely the Job Outcome fee that providers were 
invited to discount. The interpretation of these results may be that rather than payments 
acting as an incentive to deliver results, Job Outcome discounts are more likely to be a 
contracting mechanism to ensure the contract is assigned to the most efficient provider. 
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8 Conclusion 
This report has attempted to provide an indication of what drives higher performance 
among Work Programme providers.  The random assignment of individuals to one of the 
providers operating within their CPA offers the ideal circumstances to estimate the relative 
effectiveness of providers.  Furthermore, the large number of individuals randomised 
means that the precision of these estimates is maximised. 
Notwithstanding the large number of individuals randomised, when estimating variation 
across providers in their effectiveness, only 40 observations are available (one observation 
for each contract, or CPA-provider combination).  Failure to take this point into 
consideration is likely to lead to erroneous results, dramatically overstating the strength of 
observed correlations.  We have taken care to avoid such misleading inference and 
adopted a 2-stage approach that, we argue, represents best practice.   
Following this approach makes the structure of the estimation problem much more evident, 
and the constraint of small sample size readily apparent.  As discussed in Brewer et al. 
(2013), with samples of this size there may be an issue of statistical power; in other words, 
smaller correlations may go undetected.   
Other than the issue of small sample size, the essential point to bear in mind is that relating 
impacts to service characteristics is a non-experimental exercise; randomisation provides 
the experimental provider impact estimates but does not help beyond that.  In view of this, 
the estimated results do not support a causal interpretation but should instead be viewed as 
correlations. Observing a significant correlation alerts us to the possibility that there may be 
a causal relationship at play.  It does not formally confirm it, but may add to the weight of 
evidence in support of a particular type of service.  The corollary is that a non-significant 
correlation suggests that there may be no significant causal relationship.  Again, this is not 
formally a sufficient condition but it may be felt to be strongly indicative.  
With these caveats in mind, the analysis has provided some interesting findings, mostly in 
the sense that they suggest overall provider effectiveness is largely unconnected with the 
kinds of variations in service delivery observed in practice. That is not to imply that 
providers do not matter. The results from the Stage 1 report confirmed they do. However, 
the drivers of these differentials may be outside of what is currently observable and 
measureable. They may also relate to intangible characteristics of the provider, such as 
staff know-how, which are clearly difficult to include in quantitative analysis.   
However, the analysis identifies some potentially interesting results. The intensity of the 
service, as captured by the number of meetings, appears particularly important in practical 
terms.  The mode of interaction may also play a role, with telephone contact associated 
with better employment outcomes, and group meetings appear to be most suitable for ESA 
claimants. This should be seen in the context of existing related evidence. In particular, 
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Middlemas (2005) provides experimental evidence that 'signing on' by telephone rather 
than in person reduces benefit off-flow rates among JSA claimants.   While this may appear 
at odds with the findings in this report, we note that this earlier finding relates only to JSA 
claimants during the first 13 weeks of their claim rather than individuals who have been 
claiming for much longer and may have been claiming benefits other than JSA. 
One type of support that does appear promising is providing advice for setting up in 
business; this occurs against the backdrop of a slow but steady rise in self-employment in 
the UK since the 2008 recession. Other than that, there is no strong indication that the 
actual content or nature of the services provided are consistently associated with stronger 
impacts.  There are, though, numerous differences across subgroups.  Again, this can help 
direct certain types of support to those more likely to benefit from them.   
The share of  claimants stating they were informed of the consequences of non-compliance 
on the amount of benefit received is associated with considerably lower rates of Job 
Outcome and Sustainment Payments, but not employment or benefit rates.  However, it is 
important to be cautious about over-interpreting this result.  As we have already stressed, 
the results are not necessarily causal. 
At the more conceptual level, there is little evidence to support the view that the sectoral 
composition of the supply chain or the degree of competition among subcontractors has a 
bearing on effectiveness.   This is an important result, and one that has received very little 
attention in the empirical welfare-to-work literature.  The results also suggest that the 
discounts offered by providers at the time of bidding to DWP are not associated with 
reduced performance.  
We put forward a possible explanation for these results that relates to the structure of the 
market and contracting process, and has implications on the extent to which rents are 
appropriated by DWP, primes and subcontractors. These hypotheses are sufficiently 
fundamental as to warrant further detailed exploration.  However, this is beyond the scope 
of this report. 
As a final comment, while the introduction of the Work Programme did not offer any ready 
way of evaluating its success, the within-CPA randomisation was a low-cost design feature 
that worked extremely well to provide estimates of relative provider effectiveness.  This 
continues the approach used with the Flexible New Deal and there is every reason to 
repeat this with the successor to the Work Programme.  In this way, we can begin to amass 
sufficient observations on the correlates of programme effectiveness to alleviate concerns 
about possible low power and also to entertain the application of more sophisticated 
modelling techniques in an attempt to address the endogeneity of service characteristics 
that prevents us from being more definite about the causal relationships that exist in the 
data.  It would be especially helpful from this perspective to increase the number of primes 
within each CPA.  In the current case, two primes within a CPA give a single experimental 
estimate of relative effectiveness, while three primes give three such estimates.  Adding 
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additional primes within a CPA would increase the number of estimates by the total number 
of primes, less one.  For instance, having four primes rather than three would increase the 
number of estimates from three to six.  Having five primes would increase it to 10.  
However, evaluation objectives are not the only consideration; there may be practical and 
efficiency arguments for keeping the number of primes per CPA relatively low. 
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Annex A - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Customer 
group JSA 18-24 JSA 25+ Other JSA New ESA 
Other 
ESA-IB Total 
Frequency 287,720 701,485 369,029 107,551 91,711 1,557,496 
Percent 18.47 45.04 23.69 6.91 5.89 100 
       
Age of claimant 
JSA 18-24 JSA 25+ Other JSA New ESA 
Other 
ESA-IB Total 
  % % % % % % 
<=24 100 0 35.3 11.7 5.6 28 
25/34 0 33.6 20.8 19.8 15.9 22.4 
35/44 0 30.1 18.1 27.7 26.3 21.3 
45/54 0 26 17.9 28.7 34.6 19.9 
55+ 0 10.3 7.9 12.2 17.6 8.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
      
 
      Gender of 
claimant JSA 18-24 JSA 25+ Other JSA New ESA 
Other 
ESA-IB Total 
  % % % % % % 
Female 32.7 35.9 25.4 47.9 47.5 34.3 
Male 67.3 64.1 74.6 52.1 52.5 65.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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      Primary health condition - 
Summary 
JSA 18-
24 JSA 25+ 
Other 
JSA 
New 
ESA 
Other 
ESA-IB Total 
  % % % % % % 
Claimants without any diagnosis 
code on the system 100 99.9 99.8 1.3 2.5 87.4 
Mental and Behavioural 
Disorders 0 0 0.1 49.1 53.4 6.6 
Diseases of the Nervous 
System 0 0 0 3.1 4.5 0.5 
Diseases of the Circulatory or 
Respiratory System 0 0 0 4.8 4.1 0.6 
Diseases of the Musculoskeletal 
system and Connective Tissue 0 0 0 13.5 14.8 1.8 
Injury, Poisoning and certain 
other consequences of external 
causes 0 0 0 8.3 4.3 0.8 
Other 0 0 0 20 16.4 2.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
      Disadvantaged due to ex-off, 
drugs or alcohol 
JSA 18-
24 
JSA 
25+ 
Other 
JSA 
New 
ESA 
Other 
ESA-IB Total 
  % % % % % % 
None (default) 97.3 97 84.5 95.6 96.7 94 
Ex-Offender 2.3 1.8 13.2 1 0.5 4.5 
Misuser of Drugs 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Ex-Offender and Misuser of Drugs 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.4 
Misuser of Alcohol 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.2 0.4 
Ex-Offender and Misuser of Alcohol  0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Misuser of Drugs and Misuser of 
Alcohol  0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 
Ex-Offender, Misuser of Drugs and 
Misuser of Alcohol 0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
      
 
      
Disability Indicator 
JSA 18-
24 
JSA 
25+ 
Other 
JSA 
New 
ESA 
Other 
ESA-IB Total 
  % % % % % % 
Not Disabled 85.7 74.4 65.6 19.5 13.5 67 
Disabled 14.3 25.6 34.4 80.5 86.5 33 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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      Ethnicity of the 
claimant (high level) 
JSA 18-
24 JSA 25+ 
Other 
JSA New ESA 
Other 
ESA-IB Total 
  % % % % % % 
White 79.6 75.1 81.9 83 80.9 78.4 
Mixed 2.6 2 2 1.4 1.3 2 
Asian 5.9 6.2 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.6 
Black 5.5 9.2 5.7 3.8 4.6 7 
Other 1.8 3.2 1.4 2.1 2.7 2.4 
Missing 4.7 4.4 4.5 5 5.5 4.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
      
 
 
      
Highest qualification level 
JSA 18-
24 JSA 25+ 
Other 
JSA 
New
ESA 
Other 
ESA-IB Total 
  % % % % % % 
No Qualifications 6.7 10.8 13.5 7.8 5.1 10.2 
Entry Level 3 2.8 4.3 1.8 1 3 
Level 1 10.7 6.6 10.4 4.5 2.2 7.9 
Level 2 16.4 11 13.4 7.5 3.7 11.9 
Level 3 6.8 4.5 4.4 2.9 1.4 4.6 
Level 4 1.2 1.8 1.2 0.8 0.5 1.4 
Level 5 0.5 1 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.8 
Level 6 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.9 
Level 7 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Level 8 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.1 
Not Known 2.4 2.5 4.3 1.4 0.7 2.7 
Missing 51.4 57.1 47 72.3 84.9 56.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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1 digit SOC 
JSA 18-24 JSA 25+ 
Other 
JSA New ESA 
Other
ESA-IB Total 
  % % % % % % 
Managers, directors 
and senior officials 0.5 3.2 1.3 1.7 1.3 2 
Professional 
occupations 0.9 2.5 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.7 
Associate professional 
and technical 
occupations 4.3 5.2 3.3 3.3 2.9 4.3 
Administrative and 
secretarial 
occupations 9.1 9.6 6.8 6.3 5.6 8.4 
Skilled trades 
occupations 6.9 9.2 9.9 7 5.1 8.6 
Caring, leisure and 
other service 
occupations 8.6 7.3 5.9 6.9 5.1 7.1 
Sales and customer 
service occupations 31.9 16.5 19.8 10.8 7.6 19.2 
Process, plant and 
machine operatives 4.2 11 10.1 7.2 4.8 8.9 
Elementary 
occupations 33.4 35.4 40.4 20 14.7 33.9 
Missing 0.1 0.1 1.3 35.5 51.5 5.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Annex B - Summary of Phase 1 results 
The aim of this research project is to understand how provider characteristics or practices are 
associated with levels of performance. As a precondition to carrying out this work, Stage 1 of the 
project focussed on ascertaining that: 
a) The randomisation process assigning customers to providers within each CPA delivered a 
balanced profile in observable characteristics across providers.  
b) There is a statistically significant difference in provider effectiveness over and above that 
which one might expect by pure chance. 
We conduct these statistical tests by estimating a series of regression equations. Formally, we can 
modify Equation 2 in Section 5.3 to combine the effects of all provider service characteristics,    
    
and of unobserved provider service characteristics,    , into a single provider indicator,     : 
                         
               
To avoid perfect multi-collinearity between the set of provider indicators in each CPA, we first 
randomly define one provider in each CPA to be the ‘reference’ provider. The other provider, or 
providers, in each CPA are each identified as ‘treatment’ providers.  This assignment is purely 
arbitrary, does not affect the results and involves no loss of generality. The set of indicators,     , 
is therefore only included for ‘treatment’ providers.8  
Importantly, because individuals within a CPA are assigned at random to providers,      is 
independent of      and so     has a causal interpretation as the mean effect on individuals in CPA 
  of being assigned to provider   rather than the reference provider. Each two-prime CPA provides 
one estimate of relative effectiveness. Each three-prime CPA provides two estimates of relative 
effectiveness.9 In total, this gives us 22 distinct experimental estimates of relative effectiveness for 
each outcome. 
With a background characteristic as     , the joint significance of the     terms across all treatment 
providers and CPAs provides a test of whether that characteristic is balanced in the sense of being 
similar across providers within a CPA.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis of no significant 
coefficients would indicate that background characteristics are statistically similar across providers 
in the same CPA, while a rejection of the null hypothesis would indicate differences in the 
customer profiles across providers in the same CPA.  Analogously, with      as an outcome, the 
null hypothesis is of no significant variation in effectiveness.  Now, rejection of the null hypothesis 
                                                          
8
 Following this operation,    +     captures both the CPA level effect and the effect of the reference provider.  The two cannot 
be separately identified. 
9
 In 3-provider areas, 3 pair-wise comparisons can be made. However, the third estimate can be derived from the other two: A-
C= (A-B) - (C-B). Therefore, only two are independent. 
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indicates that there is significant variation in within-CPA provider effectiveness, meaning that the 
question of which provider an individual is assigned to has an important bearing on their outcomes     
The regressions are estimated using a linear probability model (OLS) with robust standard errors. 
The dependent variable is dummy taking the value 1 if an individual exhibits a given characteristic 
or achieves a given outcome and 0 otherwise. When testing for variation in outcomes, the model 
allows for the effect of individual background characteristics,     . These are omitted when testing 
for balance. This implies that our tests for variation in outcomes are more stringent. 
We run the tests over a set of 45 customer characteristics. These are: 6 age bands; gender; 
disability; being an ex-offender or with a history of alcohol or substance abuse; being a lone 
parent; being on benefit 12 months before referral; 7 indicators of mental or physical health 
conditions; 5 Work Programme Customer Groups; 6 ethnic groups; 7 indicators for educational 
qualification levels; and 9 indicators of previous occupational classification. We do this for the 
whole sample as well as by high level-Payment Group aggregates (JSA 18-24, JSA 25+, Other 
JSA, New ESA, Other ESA/IB). This delivers a large number of estimates. We therefore do not 
present these in full detail, but only discuss the overall patterns across the results.  
The first thing to note is that we find more evidence of imbalance over observable characteristics 
than we should expect purely by chance, if all tests were statistically independent. Given our 
lowest threshold of statistical significance is 10%, we might expect 4 or 5 of the F-tests on the 45 
balancing variables to come up as statistically significant by chance.  Instead, 14 of the tests 
emerge as statistically significant in the pooled sample; 8 for the JSA25+ group; 9 for New ESA 
customers; and 13 for Other ESA/IB customers. Only 1 and 4 tests come up as significant for 
JSA18-24 and Other JSA respectively. This suggests that there might be differences in observable 
customer characteristics across providers that, from a statistical point of view, depart from zero.  
However, it is also relevant to repeat that the expected number of significant results is on the 
assumption of independence; it may be that the higher number found reflects a correlation 
between outcomes. 
However, in socio-economic terms the magnitude of the coefficients is very small. For example, 
the typical difference in the share of lone parents in the whole sample of customers across any 
two providers is 0.003 or, equivalently, 0.3 percentage points. Therefore, while statistically 
significant, it is nevertheless materially very small. The largest typical difference estimated related 
to the share of customers with No Qualifications and is 0.6 percentage points. 
The fundamental point at stake is whether these balancing test results should alter our view on the 
ability of our approach to provide causal estimates of the impact of providers on outcomes. This 
would be the case if we suspected that differences in outcomes across providers could be driven 
by these small differences in the profile of customers at different providers. Our view is that this 
cannot be the case as, while there is evidence of statistically significant imbalance with regard to 
(say) sex, the estimated impacts presented in the next section are sometimes 5 or even 10 times 
larger than the observed imbalances, suggesting that any such differences would have to be 
implausibly influential on outcomes in order to suggest that the impact is not attributable to the 
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provider. We therefore conclude that there is evidence of sufficient balancing to proceed with our 
proposed approach.  
The F-tests for provider variation in outcomes generally reject the hypothesis that the provider 
dummies are jointly irrelevant to the outcome levels achieved. Furthermore, the mean absolute 
deviation between pair-wise provider comparisons is several times larger than was typically the 
case for background characteristics. The mean absolute values of the differences in the outcomes 
across providers are found to be in the order of 1-2 percentage points. Providers therefore appear 
to have a measurable effect on outcomes. 
To overcome the difficulty interpreting such a large number of estimates, we make use of 
visualisations, which can perhaps give a more immediate impression of what the data are telling 
us. Specifically, in Figure 1 we display the 26 point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for a 
selection of characteristics (top) and outcomes (bottom). Importantly, all charts use the same x-
axis scale, allowing an immediate comparison of the relative magnitudes. 
Such visual exploration reveals two important messages. Firstly, despite the statistical significance 
of some of the coefficients on pair-wise comparisons across background characteristics, their 
magnitude almost always essentially zero or negligible. On the other hand, the variation in 
provider effectiveness is much more pronounced, and in the majority of cases statistically 
significant. On this basis we interpret the results as confirming that background characteristics are 
generally balanced and that variation in provider effectiveness is present, statistically significant 
and of material magnitude. 
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Figure 1 - Visualisation of balancing tests (top row) and impacts (bottom row) 
